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Abstract
This paper investigates the eﬀects on labour supply, consumption
and savings of a change in the superannuation tax structure, involving
the taxation of contributions to a fund, pre-retirement earnings of the
fund, and the beneﬁts received from the fund during retirement. The
eﬀects on lifetime plans of tax changes are investigated using a simple
three-period model in which the ﬁnal period is retirement. The eﬀects
of unanticipated changes, requiring revisions to plans, are examined.
Although the partial eﬀects of particular tax changes are unambigu-
ous, the eﬀects of allowing for a government budget constraint mean
that it is diﬃcult to predict a priori how labour supply is likely to be
aﬀected. However, private savings unambiguously fall.
∗This research was supported by an ARC Discovery Grant.
11 Introduction
This paper examines the labour supply and savings eﬀects of a change in
superannuation taxation. The labour supply eﬀects of taxes on superannua-
tion can take several forms because of the existence of three separate stages
at which superannuation is taxed, including the contributions to a superan-
nuation fund, the earnings obtained by the fund, and the income withdrawn
from the fund after retirement. For example, a system is of the TTT variety
if tax is imposed in all three stages.1 When compulsory superannuation was
introduced in Australia, the TTT structure was adopted, making it the only
OECD country with this form. The most common scheme in the OECD
is EET, where contributions and fund earnings are exempt and only ben-
eﬁt income post retirement is subject to taxation. However, in the 2006
Australian Government Budget beneﬁts after retirement were made exempt
from taxation, with the new rules taking eﬀect on 1 July 2007.2
A complete analysis of the eﬀects of changes in taxation, on individuals at
various stages of the life cycle at the time of the change, requires a complex
model of lifetime optimisation along with a method of dealing with the po-
tential general equilibrium eﬀects and the government’s budget constraint.
The latter is relevant since the elimination of taxation on superannuation
beneﬁts obviously means that at least one other tax rate must be increased
or other transfer payments or expenditures reduced. The eﬀects on individu-
als at a given stage of their life cycle was analysed by Atkinson, Creedy and
Knox (1996) using the LITES microsimulation model. Their focus in par-
ticular was on within-generation inequality implied by alternative retirement
income strategies. But their model did not allow a general equilibrium analy-
sis or an analysis of inequality between generations. Rather than to apply a
complex general equilibrium analysis of life cycle eﬀects, the modest aim of
the present paper is to provide a preliminary analysis using a highly simpli-
ﬁed model of lifetime labour supply and consumption. Despite the simplicity
of the model, it seems useful to consider the potential direction of changes
1On the alternatives see, for example, Knox (1990), Piggott (1997), Doyle et al. (1999)
and Whitehouse (1999).
2See Australian Government (2006a, b).
2in behaviour resulting from a superannuation tax change. In particular, the
model can be used to investigate the extent to which the direction of some
changes can be anticipated ap r i o r i , without the need for detailed empirical
estimates. The model also has the potential to be extended and used as one
component of a larger and more comprehensive model.
The model is set out in Section 2. The lifetime is modelled as consisting
of three stages, the last of which is retirement. Hence it is not possible to
use the model to examine questions relating to the age of retirement, which
may be aﬀected by an unanticipated change in policy. But the eﬀects on
pre-retirement labour supply and savings, other than the compulsory super-
annuation contribution, can be investigated. Section 3 then shows how the
eﬀects of tax policy changes on those in the middle stage of the life cycle can
be examined. Some illustrative numerical examples are reported in Section
4 and brief conclusions are in Section 5.
2T h e L i f e t i m e M o d e l
This section presents the basic model used to examine the eﬀects on an in-
dividual’s labour supply and consumption decisions of alternative tax struc-
tures. Suppose the lifetime is divided into three periods, with work in the
ﬁrst two periods and retirement in the ﬁnal period. The exogenous wage
rates in the two working periods are w1 and w2. There is a compulsory su-
perannuation system, as in Australia, whereby individuals must contribute a
proportion, x, of pre-tax earnings to a fund. These contributions are taxed
at the ﬁxed rate, tc, while the fund’s earnings are taxed at the rate, ty.T h e
beneﬁts received by the fund at retirement are then taxed at the rate, tb.
This framework therefore corresponds to a simple TTT system.3 Income
tax is imposed at a constant proportional rate, t, on earnings and interest
income arising from additional savings during the ﬁrst two periods. The ex-
ogenously ﬁxed rate of interest is equal to r. Subsection 2.1 examines the
budget constraint facing the individual. Subsection 2.2 considers lifetime
3See Kingston and Piggott (1993) for an analysis of equivalence relationships among
the three tax rates tc,t y and tb.
3utility maximisation.
2.1 The Lifetime Budget Constraint
C o n s u m p t i o na n dl e i s u r ei ne a c hp e r i o da r ecj and hj,f o rj =1 ,...,T,w i t h
T =3 . The individual’s time endowment in each period is 1,a n dt h ep r i c e
of goods in each period is normalised at 1. During retirement, h3 =1 .
Private savings are treated as being made out of post-income-tax income
and accumulate at the post-tax interest rate. It is assumed that earnings,
contributions and so on are made at the beginning of each period.
The two relevant after-tax interest rates are denoted by r∗
y = r(1 − ty)
and r∗ = r(1 − t). As in standard labour supply models, the objective is
to express the budget constraint in terms of the individual’s ‘full income’.
In this context, full income is the present value of income from all sources,
if the individual devotes all the endowment of time to work during the ﬁrst
two periods of the life cycle. This is treated as if it were spent on goods and
leisure, where the latter is priced at the net wage. It is useful to consider
the relevant income ﬂows, in particular those involving the superannuation
fund. These ﬂo w sa r es h o w ni nT a b l e1 .T h eﬁrst part of the table shows the
accumulation of the fund, over two periods, arising from earnings obtained
during the ﬁr s tp e r i o d .T h es e c o n dp a r to fT a b l e1s h o w st h ec o n t r i b u t i o n
to the fund arising from earnings during the second period.
The lifetime budget constraint, assuming there are no inheritances or





































wj (1 − hj)Ej (2)
4Table 1: Income Flows
From period 1
Net earnings w1 (1 − h1)(1− x)(1− t)=Y1
Net contrib to fund in 1 xw1 (1 − h1)(1− tc)=B1
Net inc of fund in 1 rxw1 (1 − h1)(1− tc)(1− ty)=B1r∗
y


















Net earnings w2 (1 − h2)(1− x)(1− t)=Y2
Net contrib to fund in 2 xw2 (1 − h2)(1− tc)=B2
Net inc of fund in 2 rxw2 (1 − h2)(1− tc)(1− ty)=B2r∗
y





where the term Ej is given by:
Ej =( 1− t) − x
"






(1 − tc)(1− tb)
#
(3)























The left hand side of (4) represents the present value of consumption,








The right hand side of (4) is full income, denoted M. It is a simple matter to

















It is clear from the form of the budget constraint that a change in any
tax rate has both an income and price eﬀect. For example an increase in the
5income tax rate, t, implies a reduction in full income, which may typically
be expected to have a negative eﬀect on leisure and hence a positive eﬀect
on labour supply. However, the increase in t also reduces the price, that
is the opportunity cost, of leisure, leading to an increase in the demand for
leisure and hence a reduction in labour supply. The two eﬀects therefore have
opposing eﬀects on labour supply. Further analysis requires the speciﬁcation
of lifetime utility.
2.2 Utility Maximisation
As in the standard discounted utility model, suppose the individual max-








U (cj,h j) (7)
where the pure time preference rate is equal to ρ. For convenience, within-






for j =1 ,2,s ot h a tU (c3,1) = cα
3. Taking the logarithmic transformation of











Using the standard Cobb-Douglas result that the optimal value for any vari-
able is the ratio of the coeﬃc i e n to nt h a tv a r i a b l et ot h es u mo fc o e ﬃcients,
multiplied by the ratio of full income to the relevant price, consumption in
























6for j =1 ,2. It is assumed that parameters and variables are such that
h1 < 1 and h2 < 1, otherwise the treatment of corner solutions involving
non-participation in the labour market involve considerable complexities.
The eﬀect on leisure demand in any period of a change in, say, the income
















Dividing both sides by hj shows that the proportional change in leisure de-
mand, in response to a change in the tax rate, is equal to the proportional
change in full income minus the proportional change in the relative price of
leisure.
Private voluntary savings, sj,i np e r i o dj (that is not including the com-
pulsory superannuation contributions) are equal to net income minus con-
sumption, so that:
sj = Yj + b − cj (13)
Substitution for Yj and cj and diﬀerentiation shows that ∂sj/∂t is a complex
function of all the parameters in the model, but is negative.
3A P o l i c y C h a n g e
This section considers the eﬀects of introducing a tax policy change. Suppose
that the tax rate on superannuation beneﬁts from the fund is changed to t0
b,a t
the start of a period. If t0
b =0 , this corresponds to a movement from a TTT
to a TTE system. For aggregate tax revenue neutrality, at least one other tax
rate must also be changed; suppose the rate on earnings from employment is
adjusted to t0. Consequently, r∗ is adjusted to r0∗. The following results can
easily be modiﬁed for changes to other rates. For simplicity, any potential
general equilibrium eﬀects on wage rates and interest rates are ignored here.
From the point of view of those at the start of the life cycle when the
policy comes into eﬀect, there is no need to modify the results obtained above,
since their plans are simply made using the new rates. For those entering
retirement when the policy is announced, labour supply and consumption
7decisions in the previous two stages have already been made, so the only
adjustment is to consumption during retirement. Such individuals experience
an unequivocal gain. The more complex eﬀect is on those starting the second
period when tax rates change. This is examined in the following subsection.
3.1 Eﬀects of Unanticipated Tax Changes
Consider the problem of deciding on consumption in periods 2 and 3, and
labour supply in period 2, given that a choice was made in the ﬁrst period
b a s e do nd i ﬀerent tax rates. First the new budget constraint for this two-
period problem must be obtained.
The retirement fund at the start of period 3 arising from contributions







In addition, the private savings made during period 1 produce accumulated
private savings at the start of period 2 of:
S = {Y1 + b − c1}(1 + r
∗) (15)




































where, as with the tax rates, a prime attached to a variable indicates that it
is a new value resulting from revised plans following the unanticipated tax
change. The right hand side of (16) consists of earnings in period 2, net of
income tax (at the new rate) and mandatory superannuation contributions,
along with (the present value at period 2 of) accumulated superannuation
8contributions (arising from those already made in period 1 as well as new






















where the new value of E2, E0
2,i sg i v e nb y :
E
0

















































¢j−1, which must be added
to allow for transfer payments during the second and third periods.
The problem at the start of the second period is thus to maximise:
U












The sum of coeﬃcients on log-values in this two-period utility function is























These results can then be used to obtained the revised value of private savings
in the second period, as the diﬀerence between net income and consumption.
93.2 The Government’s Budget Constraint
The previous subsection has examined the revised plans of an individual
at the start of period 2 when new values of tb and t are introduced. It is a
simple matter to revise the above expressions for changes in another tax rate,
or indeed a combination of all other tax rates, in response to a change in tb.
The main point is that the government is subject to a budget constraint of
some kind. It is also possible to envisage the government as being able to
ﬁnance a reduction in revenue from one tax by borrowing, though this may
be subject to a borrowing constraint and a speciﬁct i m ep e r i o do v e rw h i c ht h e
budget must be balanced. This would introduce substantial complexities. In
tax modelling it is usual to impose revenue-neutral, or deﬁcit-neutral changes.
In the present model, where there are labour supply responses to tax
changes and more than one cohort is alive at any one time, the budget con-
straint, however speciﬁed in detail, would be highly nonlinear. Its construc-
tion also involves the precise speciﬁcation of population heterogeneity, as
aggregation over individuals is required, and this means that allowance must
be made for some individuals being below the wage threshold above which
h<1 in each period. If low wage individuals may not participate in one or
more of the ﬁrst two periods, depending on wage rate dynamics, the analysis
of labour supply actually becomes a complex programming problem.4 Hence
it is not possible to obtain expressions for the change in one tax rate con-
sequent on a change in another tax rate or government transfer payment.
However, further progress may be made in view of the fact that the direction
of changes is often unambiguous, although the order of magnitude depends
on many complex factors.
For example, consider, as above, the change in an individual’s labour
supply resulting from a change in tb, accompanied by a change in t designed
to achieve aggregate revenue neutrality. Suppose that net revenue from the
tax and transfer system (over a speciﬁed period and population group) is





4For an algorithm and discoussion in the context of two periods, see Creedy (1996,
chapter 12).
10Clearly, if tb is reduced, t must be increased by an appropriate amount to





< 0. The change in labour supply can be divided into two partial
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(24)
Given a clear idea of the sign of the tax change, along with an idea of the
partial eﬀects on labour supply of the separate taxes, it is therefore possible
to examine whether or not an unambiguous change in labour supply is to be




,d i c t a t e d
by the revenue-neutrality requirement, depends on a large number of factors,
including the sizes of diﬀerent cohorts existing at any time, the distribution
of wage rates for each time and cohort, including the life cycle pattern of
wage, the nature of preferences (and any diﬀerences among cohorts) and of
course the extend of labour supply responses themselves. In the absence of a
speciﬁcation of these additional elements, the approach adopted below is to
consider the relevant partial terms and to examine the extent to which the
direction of any changes may be unambiguous.
4 Some Numerical Examples
This section considers the properties of the model considered above, using
numerical examples. Consider a single individual with w1 = w2 =1 0 0 , and
w i t hat i m ep r e f e r e n c er a t eo fρ =0 .14. This high value is appropriate in
view of the fact that the lifetime is compressed into just three periods, so
that it is not an annual rate. Suppose also that the rate of interest is r =0 .10
and that the transfer payment in each period is equal to b =2 5 .T o t a k e
a set of ‘benchmark’ tax rates, let t =0 .3 and tc = ty = tb =0 .10.T h e
compulsory superannuation contribution in the benchmark case is assumed
to be x =0 .10. When lifetime plans are made subject to these rates, the
fact that time preference exceeds the rate of interest means that optimal
consumption falls over time: it takes the values 56.92,53.43 and 50.15 for
periods 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Labour supply is 0.57 and 0.60 respectively
11in the ﬁrst and second periods, while private savings in the ﬁrst two periods
are 4.03 and 9.13.
4.1 Complete Life-Cycle Plans
The eﬀects of variations in each of the tax and contribution rates in isola-
tion, where all other values are held constant at their benchmark values, are
shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3. These diagrams show, for each period, the
variations in savings, labour supply and the ‘price of leisure’, as the relevant
tax or contribution rate increases. For example, the top left hand segment
of Figure 1 shows the variation in the individual’s private savings (that is,
excluding compulsory superannuation contributions) in periods 1 and 2 as
the tax rate on superannuation beneﬁts increases, with all other parameters
ﬁxed at their benchmark values. Private savings in period 1 are consistently
below those of period 2, in view of the assumptions regarding time preference
and the rate of interest. The diagrams show that a reduction in the tax rate
on superannuation beneﬁts reduces private savings while increasing labour
supply in each period of the working life, as the price of leisure increases.
The changes shown in these ﬁgures are comparative static in nature: they
indicate how each variable ‘responds’ to changes in a single tax or contri-
bution rate, when the optimal plans of such an individual are made at the
beginning of the life cycle with full knowledge of those rates. They can be
used to give some idea of the eﬀects on an individual at the start of the life
cycle of a change in the tax structure, using the kind of relationship shown
in equation
(24). For example, an increase in tb can, on its own, be seen to result
in a reduction in labour supply in both periods. Also, the partial eﬀect
of a rise in t is to reduce labour supply in both periods. The government





< 0; therefore a revenue neutral change in tb does not give an
unambiguous change in labour supply.
However, the eﬀect on private savings is clear ap r i o r i , since a reduction



































































































































































































































Figure 3: The Price of Leisure
15also leads to a reduction in private savings. Hence, irrespective of the size of
the various eﬀects, including the precise tax changes needed, it can be said
that a revenue-neutral reduction in tb reduces private savings for those at the
beginning of the life cycle when the change takes place; that is, savings are
lower than they otherwise would be, without the policy change.
4.2 Unanticipated Changes
Consider next the eﬀects of a change in the tax rate on superannuation ben-
eﬁts, as it applies to an individual who is entering the second stage in the life
cycle. Let t0
b =0 , representing a move from a TTT to a TTE system. Figures
4, 5 and 6 show, respectively, the revised period-2 values of labour supply,
the price of leisure and private savings. Each ﬁgure shows, as a horizontal
line, the pre-reform planned value for period 2, made at the start of period
1. The ﬁrst part of each diagram shows the eﬀect of combining t0
b =0with a
new value of income tax, t,a n dt h es e c o n dp a r ts h o w st h ee ﬀect of combining
t0
b =0with a new value of the tax rate on superannuation contributions, tc.5
The starting point for each tax rate (that is the initial value of the relevant
tax rate indicated on the horizontal axis) is the benchmark rate indicated
above. For example the top part of Figure 4 indicates that the abolition
of the tax on beneﬁts from the superannuation fund during retirement pro-
duces, on its own, an increase in labour supply. But the resulting increase
in t, required to achieve revenue neutrality, produces, as a partial eﬀect, a
reduction in labour supply. Hence the move to TTE can increase labour sup-
ply in period 2, compared with the pre-reform plan, only if it is accompanied
by a very small increase in t.T h ee ﬀect on labour supply cannot therefore
be predicted ap r i o r i— considerable information is needed merely to predict
the direction of the change.
However, from Figure 6 it can be seen that private savings in period 2
unequivocally fall, compared with the pre-reform plans, as a result of the
combined eﬀect of the drop in tb to zero combined with an increase in t:t h i s
is because both the drop in tb and the increase in t have the same partial
5The revised values of labour supply and savings in period 2 were found to show very
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Figure 4: Labour Supply Following Change to TTE
eﬀects. When a policy shift from TTT to TTE is accompanied by an increase
in tc, required for revenue neutrality, the partial eﬀects on saving plans do not
move in the same direction. Nevertheless, it can be seen that a substantial
increase in tc would be require for savings in period 2 to increase relative to
pre-reform plans.
5 Conclusions
This paper has provided a three-period analysis of anticipated and unan-
ticipated changes in the taxation of superannuation. In particular it has
analysed the eﬀects on an individual’s labour supply, consumption and pri-
vate saving behaviour in the ﬁrst two periods of the life cycle of tax changes
Particular attention was given to the case where the individual is in the mid-
dle stage of the life cycle when the tax change is made and therefore must,
as a result of the unanticipated nature of the policy change, revise the plans


































































































Figure 6: Private Savings Following Move to TTE
18model applies to a single individual, and therefore does not allow for any
general equilibrium eﬀects — for example on the wage rate in each period.
The analysis has indicated that, even in the context of a highly simpliﬁed
life cycle model with simple proportional taxes — indeed the basic structure
of the model could hardly be simpler — determination of the eﬀects of tax
changes is highly complex.
It was nevertheless shown that the partial eﬀects of tax changes, includ-
ing a superannuation tax change, can be predicted both for those at the
beginning and in the middle of the life cycle when the policy change occurs.
Allowance was then made for the need to impose a revenue neutral change,
and consideration was given to the direction of tax changes arising from the
government’s budget constraint. It was found that a move from a TTT to a
TTE tax structure, requiring a combination of the elimination of the tax on
superannuation beneﬁts with an increase in one or more other taxes, has an
unambiguous eﬀect on individual private savings, irrespective of the stage in
the life cycle when the policy change occurs — private savings fall. However,
although the tax shift to TTE on its own increases labour supply, when com-
bined with the income tax or contributions tax increase required for revenue
neutrality, the overall eﬀect on labour supply cannot be predicted ap r i o r i .
It is suggested that the approach taken here provides a useful demonstration
of the elements required of a much larger model which might be designed to
handle aggregation and general equilibrium considerations.
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